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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 13-3426 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
KASSAR J. CHITOLIE,  
a/k/a Fnu Lnu,  
a/k/a Out Cast,  
a/k/a  Sealed Defendant 
 
Kassar J. Chitolie, 
                     Appellant 
 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
(D.C. No. 3-11-cr-00016-010) 
District Judge: Honorable Curtis V. Gomez 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 12, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 17, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
                                                
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Kassar Chitolie appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm.   
I 
This case involves a drug distribution conspiracy in which Chitolie sold marijuana 
and cocaine to Herbert Ferguson, who then sold drugs to others.  At trial, Ferguson 
testified that he bought marijuana from Chitolie, who he also knew as “Outcast,” App. 
456, two times per month in quantities “no less than a quarter pound[ and] no more than a 
half a pound,” App. 544.  The jury also heard wiretapped conversations between 
Ferguson and Chitolie about Chitolie’s marijuana sales.  In several calls, they discussed 
transactions involving “one girl,” “Bob Marley,” “green hat,” “T-shirts,” “green 
Christmas tree,” “Reggie,” and “Popcorn,” all of which, Ferguson explained, were code 
words for marijuana.  App. 650-52, 654-55.  In other calls, Ferguson spoke with his son 
about meeting Chitolie to complete a marijuana purchase.     
Ferguson also testified about Chitolie’s cocaine sales and the jury heard 
wiretapped conversations about them.  On one call, Chitolie told Ferguson that Chitolie 
had an “8-ball,” code for four and a half ounces of cocaine, to supply to Ferguson.  App. 
653.  On another call, Ferguson told Chitolie that he did not want “[t]he plate of food 
[Chitolie was] sending” to be “cook[ed]” and that Chitolie should “[j]ust send the food 
raw.”  App. 654.  Ferguson explained that he was telling Chitolie that he did not want 
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cocaine base, but rather cocaine powder.     
The jury convicted Chitolie of violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 843(b), and 846.  
The District Court sentenced him to concurrent terms of twenty-seven months’ 
imprisonment for each of the counts as well as concurrent terms of supervised release.  
Chitolie appeals. 
II1 
A 
 Chitolie’s assertion that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions 
for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute 
is without merit.2  To prove a conspiracy of the sort alleged here, the Government must 
show “(1) a shared unity of purpose; (2) an intent to achieve a common illegal goal; and 
(3) an agreement to work toward that goal.”  United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 
F.3d 418, 425 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc).3  It “need not prove that each defendant knew all 
of the conspiracy’s details, goals, or other participants,” but must “proffer sufficient 
evidence from which a jury could have concluded that each drug transaction in which 
[the defendant] was involved was a step in achieving the conspiracy’s common goal of 
                                                
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.   
2 Chitolie does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). 
3 We exercise plenary review over an appeal from the grant or denial of a 
judgment of acquittal, reviewing the record “in the light most favorable to the prosecution 
to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 430 (quotation marks, alterations, 
and internal citations omitted).   
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distributing [drugs] for profit.”  United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(quotation marks and internal citations omitted).   
 Sufficient evidence supported Chitolie’s conspiracy conviction.  Ferguson testified 
that he bought marijuana and cocaine from Chitolie.  Furthermore, they used coded 
language and Ferguson’s son as a courier to facilitate the drug transactions.  This 
demonstrated Chitolie’s “repeated, familiar dealings with members of [the] conspiracy” 
and therefore provided sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that he 
“comprehend[ed] fully the nature of the group with whom he [wa]s dealing . . . and [that 
he was] more likely to perform drug-related acts for conspiracy members in an effort to 
maintain his connection to them.”  Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199.  
 To prove possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, the 
Government must prove “(1) knowing or intentional (2) possession (3) with intent to 
distribute (4) a controlled substance.”  United States v. Lacy, 446 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Here, the conviction is supported by ample evidence of Chitolie’s sale of 
marijuana to Ferguson.  Ferguson testified and recordings showed that he discussed the 
purchase of marijuana from Chitolie and that Ferguson’s son in fact travelled to meet 
Chitolie and obtain marijuana.  Therefore, sufficient evidence supports Chitolie’s 
conviction for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and his 
contention otherwise is without merit. 
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B 
 Chitolie also has not shown that the District Court erred in limiting his ability to 
cross-examine Ferguson about the benefits of Ferguson’s plea agreement.  The 
Confrontation Clause does not provide an “unfettered right[] to cross-examine 
witnesses.”  United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 356 (3d Cir. 2011).  Instead, 
district courts “retain[] wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on such cross-
examination based on concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the 
witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”  United 
States v. John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186, 211 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks, alterations, 
and internal citations omitted).   
 Here, the District Court limited inquiry about the specific sentence Ferguson 
would have faced absent his cooperation but permitted questions about whether Ferguson 
faced a “substantial” sentence.  App. 739.  As Ferguson and Chitolie faced similar 
charges and questions about the specific sentence Ferguson faced might therefore have 
influenced the jury’s deliberations with improper considerations about Chitolie’s 
potential sentence, there was no abuse of discretion.  John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d at 212.  
Furthermore, contrary to Chitolie’s assertions, the District Court permitted Ferguson to 
be cross-examined, within the proper confines of the hearsay rule, about the extent to 
which his plea agreement secured benefits for his wife and son.  Indeed, Chitolie and his 
codefendants thoroughly cross-examined Ferguson about the benefits he received or 
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hoped to receive from his testimony.  Thus, there was no improper limit on his cross-
examination. 
C 
 Chitolie also contends that the District Court erred in admitting photographs of 
drugs found in Ferguson’s home.  Because Chitolie did not object, we review for plain 
error.4  A district court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence.”  Fed. R. Evid. 403.  While Ferguson testified that the 
drugs depicted were provided by a different conspirator, not Chitolie, the photographs 
were nonetheless probative of Ferguson’s role in the drug distribution chain and tended to 
make the existence of the conspiracy more probable.  Thus, we cannot say that the 
prejudice flowing from the admission of the photographs substantially outweighed their 
probative value.  Hence, there was no error, plain or otherwise, in admitting this evidence 
under Rule 403. 
D 
 Ferguson’s recorded statements were also properly admitted as co-conspirator 
statements under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).  Under that rule, the District Court must 
                                                
4 Under the plain error standard, we will reverse only if (1) there was error; (2) the 
error was clear or obvious; (3) it affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) it 
“seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  
United States v. Stinson, 734 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks and internal 
citations omitted). 
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find by a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the declarant 
and the party against whom the statement is offered were members of the conspiracy; (3) 
the statement was made in the course of the conspiracy; and (4) it was made in 
furtherance of the conspiracy.”5  United States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2002).  
“To prove these elements, the Government may rely on the co-conspirator’s statements 
themselves, if they are corroborated by independent evidence.”  United States v. Turner, 
718 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2013).    
  Here, the District Court properly concluded that there was sufficient evidence of a 
conspiracy between Ferguson, his son, Chitolie, and others to admit Feguson’s statements 
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).6  Moreover, any reliance on Ferguson’s statements themselves 
in making that finding was not error as independent evidence corroborated the existence 
of a conspiracy, including Ferguson’s in-court testimony that Chitolie sold him marijuana 
and cocaine and he sent his son to retrieve drugs from Chitolie.  See United States v. 
Mitchell, 596 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2010) (relying on cooperating witness’s in-court 
testimony to corroborate that witness’s out-of-court statements to establish existence of a 
conspiracy under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)); United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 659-60 (3d 
                                                
5 We review the District Court’s findings for clear error.  United States v. Vega, 
285 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2002). 
6 Chitolie’s claim that the District Court’s ruling lacked the requisite findings also 
fails to provide a basis for relief.  See United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1081 n.11 
(3d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he failure to make the explicit finding [of conspiracy] does not render 
the district court ruling reversible” where “the necessary threshold determination is 
implicit in the court’s decision to send the case to the jury.” (quotation marks and internal 
citation omitted)). 
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Cir. 1993) (relying on patient’s testimony to corroborate doctor’s out-of-court statements 
to establish existence of a conspiracy under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)).  Ferguson’s statements 
were also corroborated by admissions Chitolie made during the recorded conversations.  
Thus, the recorded statements were properly admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 
E 
 Chitolie’s assertion that his sentence violates Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
2151 (2013), is also without merit.  In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that “‘any fact 
that increases the mandatory minimum sentence is an “element” that must be submitted 
to the jury’ and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Winkelman, 746 
F.3d 134, 135 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2155) (internal alteration 
omitted).  Therefore, where a fact, such as drug quantity, “trigger[s] a statutory 
mandatory minimum sentence[, it] must . . . be submitted to a jury.”  United States v. 
Smith, 751 F.3d 107, 117 (3d Cir. 2014).  If, however, no statutory mandatory minimum 
sentence is triggered, the absence of an allegation in the indictment or a jury finding with 
respect to a fact that could otherwise trigger a mandatory minimum is irrelevant.  
Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2159-60; United States v. Freeman, 763 F.3d 322, 336 (3d Cir. 
2014).  Furthermore, “factual findings made for purposes of applying the [Sentencing] 
Guidelines, which influence the sentencing judge’s discretion in imposing an advisory 
Guidelines sentence and do not result in imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence, 
do not violate the rule in Alleyne . . . so long as the ultimate sentence imposed [is] within 
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the statutorily prescribed range.”  Freeman, 763 F.3d at 335-36 (quotation marks and 
internal citations omitted). 
 The offense for which Chitolie was convicted on Count One, conspiracy to 
possess with intent to distribute, is subject to a five-year mandatory minimum because the 
jury found that the conspiracy involved twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base.  21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).  The District Court, however, did not attribute this amount to 
Chitolie, explaining that it did not find evidence to support Chitolie’s involvement with 
cocaine base,7 and sentenced him without a mandatory minimum, applying instead a 
statutory range of zero to twenty years’ imprisonment pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1)(C).  Therefore, as Chitolie’s twenty-seven month sentence did not involve a 
mandatory minimum and fell below the statutorily prescribed maximum, neither the 
indictment nor the jury was required to specify a drug quantity.8  Freeman, 763 F.3d at 
336.   
                                                
7 Neither party challenges the District Court’s authority to decline to apply the 
mandatory minimum and reject the jury’s finding based on its review of the evidence. 
8 The District Court also did not err in adopting the findings in the Presentence 
Report with respect to marijuana and cocaine quantities, as those findings were supported 
by a preponderance of the evidence, including testimony from Ferguson about his 
purchases from Chitolie.  Stinson, 734 F.3d at 184 (“At sentencing, a district court must 
find facts that relate to application of the Guidelines by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”). 
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F 
 Chitolie’s assertion that the District Court erred in denying a downward role 
adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 also fails.9  Section 3B1.2 permits a downward 
adjustment of a defendant’s offense level if the defendant was “substantially less culpable 
than the average participant.”  U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(A).  In determining whether this 
adjustment is warranted, district courts should consider “such factors as the nature of the 
defendant’s relationship to other participants, the importance of the defendant’s actions to 
the success of the venture, and the defendant’s awareness of the nature and scope of the 
criminal enterprise.”  United States v. Self, 681 F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 2012) (quotation 
marks and internal citations omitted).   
 Here, the factors support the District Court’s decision not to apply the adjustment.  
First, “the importance of [Chitolie’s] actions to the success of the venture” is apparent.  
Id.  Chitolie was a supplier of marijuana and cocaine and hence he “did not indirectly 
further a criminal activity or further that activity in some minor way” but “directly 
engaged in the very act at the heart of the criminal enterprise—namely, the distribution of 
drugs in exchange for money.”  Id. (upholding decision not to apply adjustment where 
defendant “merely carr[ied] out the instructions of his . . . brother” by “simply receiving 
the payment for a previously negotiated transaction”).  Second, the frequency with which 
he supplied drugs to Ferguson, the fact that he supplied both marijuana and cocaine, and 
                                                
9 We review a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, 
findings of fact for clear error, and application of the Guidelines to facts for abuse of 
discretion.  United States v. Kluger, 722 F.3d 549, 555 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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his interactions with Ferguson’s son demonstrate his relationship to the other members of 
the conspiracy and his knowledge of the nature and scope of the venture.  This evidence 
supports the District Court’s decision not to apply the downward adjustment.  Id. (finding 
factors did not support downward adjustment where defendant was entrusted with 
distributing “wholesale quantities of drugs worth hundreds of dollars”). 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
